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ETHANOL'S ROOTS: How BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION
CREATED THE INTERNATIONAL ETHANOL BOOM
VANESSA M. CORDONNIER*
INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 2007, President Bush, in conjunction with Brazil's
President, Lula da Silva, announced the formation of a new partnership
between the two countries.' Capitalizing on the strength of the ethanol
industry in both countries, the partnership was aimed at broad goals of
developing new ethanol production technologies, sharing resources and
promoting the use of ethanol as an alternative to fossil fuel.2 Brazil is
currently the world's leading producer and exporter of ethanol and the
United States follows close behind.3 While the announcement of the deal
received international press coverage, the media focused mostly on the
fierce protests by Brazilian citizens against President Bush's policies in
Iraq.4
This ethanol partnership merits a far greater examination, how-
ever, as its effects could be extraordinarily far-reaching. An increase in
the already large-scale ethanol industry in the U.S. and Brazil could por-
tend a similar increase in harmful environmental effects on a national
and international level. For example, there is evidence to suggest that
an expansion of ethanol production in any country necessarily demands
an expansion of land area used to grow the crops from which ethanol is
produced-primarily corn in the U.S. and sugar cane in Brazil. If crop
* The author is an Assistant Attorney General in the Environmental Bureau of the Office
of the Illinois Attorney General. She received a J.D. from the University of Illinois
College of Law, and a B.A. from the University of Chicago. She has lived in Brazil, and
is fluent in Portuguese. The author would like to thank Professor Robert Sharpe for his
time and guidance.
'Peter Baker, U.S., Brazil Team Up To Promote Ethanol, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007, at
A12, available at httpJ/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentartile/2007/03/09/AR
2007030902102.html.
2 Id.
3 USDA, THE ECONoMic FEASIBILITY OF ETHONOL PRODUCTION FROM SUGAR IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (July 2006), httpi/www.usda.gov/oce/EthanolSugarFeasibilityReport3.pdf.
4 Peter Baker, Bush Continues on Latin America Tour, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2007/03/10/AR2007
031000504.html.
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production for ethanol use proves to be economically viable for farmers
and large industries, such expansion could push crops used for food to
marginal or protected land, or largely eliminate land currently used for
food production.5 Additionally, questions still surround the level of harmful
emissions created both from the mobile sources that use ethanol as well as
emissions from ethanol plants themselves. Debate over the efficiency of
ethanol production remains unresolved. Critics point to data that ques-
tions the overall net energy used to produce ethanol in comparison to
production of fossil fuels. Additionally, large monocultures of corn or sugar
cane could be disastrous to the surrounding ecosystems.
The litany of questions and controversies surrounding ethanol are
especially relevant in light of the current ethanol production boom in the
United States. However, this is not the first time an industrial nation has
attempted to create and promote a massive ethanol production industry.
Starting in 1975, Brazil began a national program to promote ethanol
production, setting a goal to produce 3.5 billion liters of ethanol by the
year 1980.6 The program has met and vastly exceeded that goal, becoming
the largest producer of ethanol for domestic and international use.' Before
the U.S. embarks on a full-scale national promotion of the ethanol indus-
try, it would do well to look to Brazil's program, noting both the successes
and missteps the country has made along the way.
This paper will examine, in detail, the history of Brazil's ethanol
industry, looking closely to legal incentives used by the government over
the past three decades to spur the industry's remarkable growth. Brazil's
dominance in the international ethanol market is due, largely, to govern-
ment involvement in the sugar cane industry, but has been shaped by
international politics as well as market forces. In addition, this paper will
look to possible creative alternatives to mainstream ethanol production
systems in both the U.S. and Brazil. The current ethanol boom in the
United States has the strong support of the Presidential administration
as well as many very vocal interest groups. By looking to Brazil's history,
this paper will examine whether a similar program in the U.S. would be
in the best interests of the nation and the environment.
5Andrew Martin, Farmers Head to Fields to Plant Corn, Lots of It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2007, at C1, available at http'J/www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/business/3 lcorn.html.
6 F. JOSEPH DEMETRIUS, BRAziL's NATIONAL ALCOHOL PROGRAM: TECHNOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 47 (1990).
'In 2007, Brazil produced 17.47 billion liters of ethanol. Editorial, Produ do nacional de
cana-de-agticar deve crescer 15,2% neste ano, 0 DIA ONLINE (Braz.), Aug. 30, 2007, httpJ/
odia.terra.com.br/economia/htm/geral_120564.asp.
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I. HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN ETHANOL PRODUCTION
Brazil is currently the world's leading producer and exporter of
ethanol for fuel.8 The ethanol industry in the country is based, almost
exclusively, on the use of sugar cane. Sugar cane production has histori-
cally been concentrated in two main areas in the country, the Northeast,
in the states of Algoas and Pernambuco and the Center South, in the
state of Sao Paulo.9 The ethanol industry has expanded enormously in
the past three decades, due largely to strong governmental incentives
and pro-ethanol legislation.
A. Before the Ethanol Boom
Brazil has historically had a robust sugar cane production industry,
and in the'years before the national ethanol program was initiated, a great
number of sugar cane plantations were owned and operated by smaller,
independent growers.' ° Without additional processing, such as milling
sugar, producing ethanol or producing derivatives, sugar cane in and of
itself possesses little economic value. 1 As a result, those individuals who
are in control of the sugar mills have essentially controlled the industry.
Though sugar cane production has its origins in the colonial era
in Brazil, it only became a direct part of the Brazilian government's eco-
nomic plan in 1933 with the creation of the national agency, the Institute
of Sugar and Alcohol (IAA).' 2 Speaking to an international symposium of
sugar manufacturers in 1985, the President of the IAA at the time looked
to the history of the sugar cane industry in Brazil and traced direct state
intervention to the reign of Dom Manoel I, the King of Portugal from 1495
to 1521.13
[R] egarding State intervention in Brazil's sugar cane agro-
industry, this intervention started when the first sugar
cane mill was built in 1516. Ordered by Dom Manoel, the
King of Portugal, a search was made to find and elect a
'USDA, supra note 3, at 27.
9 CHRISTINE BOLLING & NYDIA R. SUAREZ, THE BRAZILiAN SUGAR INDUSTRY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook/SSS-232 (Sept. 2001) (Economic
Research Service/USDA), http.//www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing(Brazil/braziiansugar.pdf.
1O DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 147.
11 Id. at 35.12 JOSE APRIGIO BRANDAO VILELA, The Brazilian Model, in COPERSUCAR INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON SUGAR AND ALCOHOL: Sao Paulo 41 (1985).13 Id. at 42.
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practical and capable man who was to go to Brazil and start
a sugar cane mill. He was to receive all the money neces-
sary, as well as the copper, iron, and everything else needed
in order to set up the mill.14
In his remarks to Copersucar (the international sugar manufacturers
symposium), the IAA President argued that this "interventionist attitude"
has prevailed since 1516, finding its modern foothold in 1933 with the
creation of the IAA and in 1939 with a governmental decree declaring that
the export and external marketing of sugar was a State monopoly. 15
In 1941, the Sugar Cane Agriculture Statute was enacted and
created a quota system for sugar cane production." The IAA was charged
with determining the production level for all growers, large or small, in-
dependent or mill owners. 7 In an effort to protect smaller, independent
farmers, the act created a guarantee that at least 60 percent of all sugar
cane would be provided by independent farmers. 8 The quota system,
though, had an opposite effect.
Although ostensibly strengthening the bargaining position
of the independent producers, quotas actually served to
weaken their position. A failure to meet their quota meant
a reduction in the quota itself, an administrative penalty
for which there was no recourse. As a result, the quota
system, the most important tool in the IAA's regulatory
arsenal, offered only nominal protection to fornecedores9
from the power of mill owners.2 °
Including the 1941 Statute, there have been around 20 Federal
Directives and Resolutions addressing the sugar cane industry in the
years before 1975-a pivotal year as shall be explored later in this paper.
Resolution n' 109/45 of June 27, 1945 set forth a subsidy program for
lower-producing sugar mills as well as establishing a base price for sugar.2'
14/d.
15 Id.6 Decreto No. 3.855, de 21 de novembro de 1941, D.O.U. de 21.11.1941 (Braz.) available
at www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del3855.htm.
1d. at Titulo I, Capitulo IV, art. 11.
'
8 Id. at Titulo III, Capitulo I, art. 48.
'
9 Fornecedores-independent growers.
20 DEMETRrUS, supra note 6, at 36.
21 21 Decreto No. 6.969, de 19 de Outubro de 1944, Disp6e sobre os fornecedores de cana
que lavram terra alheia e dA outras provid~ncias available at httpJ/www2.camara.gov.br/
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In Directive n0 308 of February 28, 1967, the government guaranteed a
base price of 1.57 Cruzeiros (the national currency at the time) for every
60 kilo bag of sugar which was destined for domestic consumption and
guaranteed a base price of .01 Cruzeiros per liter of alcohol which was
destined for domestic consumption.22 The Brazilian government continued
to modify its pricing and subsidy plans for the sugar industry through
various statutes.
Apart from the 1941 Statute and sundry other statutes and reso-
lutions, other economic and social factors contributed to the steady decline
of smaller, independent sugar cane farmers in Brazil. During the inter-
national sugar boom of the early 1970s, the Brazilian government tempo-
rarily suspended the quota system of the 1941 Statute to allow farmers to
take advantage of higher sugar prices. By relaxing its constraints on the
amount of sugar a single farmer could produce, the government spurred
a dramatic increase in the amount of sugar cane grown by large-scale
producers.2 4 This led to the rapid expansion of large-scale mills as they
were better equipped to produce sugar more efficiently than smaller, inde-
pendent mills.2 Additionally, there was no legal restraint on the amount
of land a sugar producer could buy, leading to larger producers assimilat-
ing smaller, struggling farmers.26
Since Article 51 of the Sugar Cane Cultivation Statute of
1941 allowed mill owners to surpass their legal limit of 40
percent when the production of cane by independents was
deemed insufficient, mill owners often purchased all or most
of the lands close to the refinery, thereby reducing the out-
put of the fornecedores. As the percentage of cane grown
by independents declined, the usineiro27 could then request
the IAA to raise its production quota.28
internet/legislacao/legin.html/textostvisualizarTexto.html?ideNorma=458339&seqTexto=
1&PalavrasDestaque=.
22 Decreto No. 308, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, D.O.U. de 28.02.1967 available at www
.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/DelO308.htm.
2 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 36.
24/Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 36-37.
27 LAROUSSE CONCISE DICTIONARY: PORTUGUESE-INGLES, INGLES-PORTUGUESE, 389
(2003) (defining usineiro as a mill owner).
' DEMETRUS, supra note 6, at 37.
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With greater and greater economic incentive to produce ethanol
from the sugar cane crop, large-scale growers slowly co-opted the tradi-
tionally smaller, individual farmers in Brazil.
This long-term movement toward greater concentration of
land and production in fewer and fewer hands has been
accompanied by a growing predominance of sugar cane
monoculture as the standard form of cane cultivation. The
elimination of a large number of small policulture producers
and the frequent incorporation of their lands into larger
units has resulted in a seemingly unstoppable rise of sugar
cane monoculture. The concentration of cane production,
more often than not, came at the direct expense of small
producers and their basket of agricultural goods.29
Contributing to the decrease in smaller, independent growers and
the increase in larger, industrial growers who also controlled sugar mills,
was the nature of transporting the sugar cane itself. As sugar cane is a
bulky and difficult-to-transport crop, independent growers became beholden
to a single buyer-the sugar mill in closest proximity to their farm-if they
wished to minimize their transportation costs. 30
Even for large-scale farmers, mechanized harvesting of sugar cane
has not yet become economically viable. Around 80 percent of the sugar
cane crop is still harvested manually, requiring the use of seasonal labor-
ers. 3 The traditional practice of harvesting sugar cane in Brazil involves
burning the crop at the end of the growing season.32 The entire field is set
on fire, a process that may seem paradoxical to the goal of harvesting the
cane.33 Burning, however, serves two purposes. First, the fire burns off
the sharp outer leaves of the sugar cane plant and allows laborers to more
easily navigate the field and harvest the cane.' Second, the fire is used as
a precautionary measure benefitting laborers as it kills off or drives away
venomous snakes that may be in the field.3" The fire does not harm the
'Id. at 35.
30 Id. at 35-36.
31 1d. at 41 n.16.
32 Erika Engelhaupt, Burning Sugarcane Releases Ozone-Producing Nitrogen,
ENvmoNMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 5, 2007, http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/
journals/esthag-w/2007/dec/science/eeBrazilbiofuels.html.33 Id.
3 Id.
3 Id.
292 [Vol. 33:287
ETHANOL'S ROOTS
crop itself as the water-rich and extremely hardy stalks are left unharmed
by the burning process. Though there are laws that expressly prohibit
burning of crops, they are not often enforced.3"
By 1975, the sugar cane industry in Brazil was dominated by a
small, elite group of large-scale farms who controlled over 60 percent of
sugar cane production.37
In the half century before [1975], the usineiro elites had
expanded and solidified their influence over the industry,
over the IAA that nominally regulated it, and over inde-
pendent growers. They had successfully voided the quota
system of the 1941 Statute of Sugar Cane Cultivation; they
had achieved production and productivity levels usually
unmatched by smaller growers.3"
The emergence of the large-scale farmers as a political and economic
powerhouse in the sugar cane industry had a disastrous effect on the in-
dependence of smaller-scale farmers.3" The total number of sugar mills
declined substantially in the twenty-five years before 1975. 4 Fewer mills,
combined with increased total land area of larger farms meant that the
distance between independent growers' farms and the end destination of
the crop, the sugar mill, often increased.4'
Since the transportation of cane is very costly and since the
official price paid for cane is uniform, fornecedores often
incur higher expenses without the benefit of higher reve-
nue. Relative to the mill owner, the productivity of the inde-
pendents often fell as uncompensated transportation costs
rose. Other factors being equal, the cost per ton of sugar
cane is considerably higher for independents simply because
of their geographical disadvantage: their fields are located
farther from the sugar mills than those of mill owners.42
One such law is Decreto No. 97.635, de 10 de abril de 1989, Regula o art. 27 do C6digo
Florestal e disp6e sobre a prevenqAo e combate a inchndio flrestal, e di outras providgncias.
37 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 39.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 38.
40 Id. at 38.41 1d.
42 Id.
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By 1975, the large-scale producers had effectively amassed the
bulk of the sugar cane industry in the country. "In 1975,... the usineiro
elites, and especially the Paulista element, had become industrial and agri-
cultural powers unto themselves. Their hegemony over the sector had be-
come virtually complete. The mill owners were the undisputed rulers of
the world's largest sugar industry."
4 3
B. The Creation of Proalcool
Established on November 14, 1975 by presidential decree, Proalcool
(Programa Nacional do Alcool) was created at a time of great flux in the
international sugar industry. The oil crisis of 1973 had sent gasoline
prices soaring internationally, and the Brazilian government decided to
look to possible domestic sources of fuel production in order to insulate
itself from the chaotic market." The program was aimed at bolstering
Brazil's national sugar economy by safeguarding the privately owned
sugar industry.45 "Proalcool sought to stabilize the industry prices by
mandating that excess sugar be turned into anhydrous ethanol which
would be blended with gasoline."4"
The specific text of the Presidential Decree creating the program,
Decree n' 76.593 of November 14, 1975, established a baseline of govern-
mental involvement in the ethanol industry in Brazil.47 Article 2 of the
Proalcool decree specifically named the feedstock crops the government
had in mind to supply the ethanol plants-sugar cane and manioc root and
any other raw material that would be particularly suited to the increase
in ethanol production.' This increase, the decree noted, would necessarily
include the increase of agricultural production of the feedstock, modern-
ization, and modification of existing sugar distilleries.49
Article 3(b) of the decree defined the principle goals of the program:
(i) reduce regional disparities in production of ethanol, (ii) increase the
availability of necessary implements of production, both in the agricul-
ture setting and in sugar distilleries; and (iii) help assuage the cost of
4 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 39.
4 Environmental News Network, Sugarcane Ethanol: Brazil's Biofuel Success, Jan. 3,
2008, http://www.enn.com/ecosystems/article/28580#.
45 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 43.
46/d.
47 Decreto No. 76.593, de 14 de novembro do 1975, D.O.U. de 20.02.1976. (Braz.).
4' Id. at Article 2.
49 Id.
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transportation of the product."0 Article 4 speaks directly to financial in-
centives used to bolster production, stating that the investments and ex-
penses related to the Program would be financed by the national system
of banks.5'
Article 5(a) stated that investments used for installation, mod-
ernization or expansion of distilleries would be provided by the Banco
Nacional do Desenvolvimento Economico, by the Banco do Brasil, by the
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, and by the Banco da Amazonia. 2 Invest-
ments aimed at increasing raw material production would be handled by
Sistema Nacional de Credito Rural. Section (b)§1 mandated that the
National Monetary Council would assist regions where the feedstock pro-
duction was not traditionally cultivated, or regions of low cultivation or
conditions of special interest.5 "
Article 7 stated that in order to guarantee the commercialization
of anhydrous alcohol, of whatever origin, the National Petroleum Council
would establish a program of distributing ethanol between existing petro-
leum companies at a fixed price to be decided by the Council. 4
The Proalcool mandate was simple enough to implement as alcohol
plants already in operation required only simple modifications to produce
ethanol. "These modernized facilities, known as adjacent distilleries or
anexas were, as their name implies, attached or annexed to working sugar
mills." 5 Proalcool's specific mandate was to produce 3.5 billion liters of
ethanol from sugar cane by 1980.6 For comparison's sake: in the year be-
fore Proalcool was initiated, 1974, the nation had 130 ethanol distilleries
which produced 625 million liters of ethanol from sugar cane. 7 In addi-
tion to this production goal, the program hoped to achieve broader socio-
economic goals as well. These included: "foreign exchange savings, the re-
duction of regional and personal income disparities, the fuller utilization
of idle land and labor resources, and the expansion of the production of
capital goods made in Brazil.""
o Id. at Article 3(b)(I)-(III).
51Id. at Article 4.52 Id. at Article 5(a).
5 Decreto No. 76.593, supra note 47, at Article 5(b) §1.
"4 Id. at Article 7.
' DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 43.
MId. at 11.
" Felix Andrade Silva, The Logistics Behind Proalcool in COPERSUCAR INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON SUGAR AND ALCOHOL 521 (1985).
1 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 43.
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In the first years after the creation of Proalcool, many of the goals
of the program were achieved.59 Sugar prices were stabilized as many exist-
ing sugar plants expanded or constructed alcohol fermentation and distil-
lation processes, turning millions of tons of surplus sugar into ethanol. °
"These new facilities, known as annexed or adjacent plants (anexas),
were located near or directly attached to existing sugar or sugar-ethanol
mills . . . . [A]nexas then sold ethanol at pre-established prices to
Petrobras, the national petroleum company that mixed the ethanol into
gasoline and then distributed it on a nation-wide basis."6' Even though
at the inception of Proalcool the Brazilian sugar industry was the largest
in the world, the continued mandate to increase production of ethanol
required substantial subsidies for farmers and producers. 2
In order to boost the domestic market for ethanol, the government
instituted an ever-changing mandate of blending ethanol with gasoline to
be sold to consumers.' The blending percentages were in great flux in the
first years as the government adapted to consumer interest in the prod-
uct and transporting the product across the country.' In the beginning,
only the state of Sao Paulo and the Northeast region of the country were
required to sell blended gasoline to consumers.65 Slowly, that mandate ex-
panded to the rest of the country.6 For example, in 1976, the government
required the state of Sao Paulo and the Northeast to mix 10 to 15% of alco-
hol with gasoline.67 In addition to these two major zones of production,
the government required the states of Rio de Janeiro and the northern
part of the state of Parana to blend its gasoline at a 10 to 15% mixture of
ethanol.68 The states of Rio de Janeiro and Parana border the state of Sao
Paulo, making the transportation of ethanol efficient.
In 1977, the government increased the required blend to 20% for
the city of Sao Paulo, capital of the state of Sao Paulo, while the interior
of the state, Rio de Janeiro, Parana and the Northeast were mandated to
use a 12% blend.69 At the time, the government stated that the increase
59 d. at 10-11.
6Id. at 11.
61 Id.
62Id.
' Silva, supra note 57, at 521-22.
6 See id.
See id.; Bolling & Suarez, supra note 9, at 15.
See Silva, supra note 57, at 521-22.67 Id. at 521.
6 Id.
69/Id.
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to 20% of blended gasoline in the city of Sao Paulo was an attempt to
reduce harmful pollution caused by lead-based gasoline emissions from
mobile sources.7' By 1979, the government mandated the ethanol blend to
be set at 20% for the entire country.' The supply of ethanol to the coun-
try as a whole, however, proceeded in fits and starts. Priority in distrib-
uting the blended fuel was given to the primary areas of production and
then slowly expanded out from those nexus points.72 The first chosen
areas of expansion were the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Brazilia,
Belo Horizonte, Maceio, Recife, Joao Pessoa and Natal.73
The year 1979 also saw the first pumps, 300 to begin with, for pure
hydrated alcohol installed at gas stations across the country.74 As for trans-
portation, the government initially installed storage tanks for the ethanol
between the centers of production and the centers of consumption and then
slowly adapted the transportation structure already in place for gasoline
to accommodate ethanol as well." A striking example of this was in the
state of Sao Paulo.76 At the time, the state had a pipeline that was used by
Petrobras, the governmentally-backed national oil company, which had
six branches that extended 320 kilometers within the state and jutted into
the bordering state of Parana for an additional 100 kilometers.77 At the
time, Petrobras was able to alternate the transportation of ethanol through
the pipeline with the transportation of oil. 8
In the early years after Proalcool, ethanol was produced nearly
exclusively by existing sugar mills that had expanded their distillation
capacity. 9 While this allowed the existing sugar cane industry to mini-
mize their initial investments, it eventually led to several long-term con-
sequences for the industry as a whole."0
[Ilt forged an indissoluble link among sugar cane cultiva-
tion, the sugar industry, and alcohol production. Second,
rather than develop a technology distinct from that of the
7 0 Id. at 522.
71 Id.
72 See Silva, supra note 57, at 521; Bolling & Suarez, supra note 9, at 15.
71 See Silva, supra note 57, at 522-23.74 Id. at 523.75 id.
71 Id. at 527.
77 id.
78 id.
79 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 76.
8 Id.
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sugar sector, the program adopted the technology of the
sugar industry as it existed in 1975. The Program thereby
limited itself to an agro-industrial structure based largely
in a single state and under the control of an elite that had
consolidated itself and its privileges during the past half
century.8'
However, this system of simply modifying existing plants allowed
for a degree of flexibility in the industry. 2 If the price of sugar rose in
comparison to the price of ethanol, plants could easily return to sugar
production.' "Proalcool's initial 'marriage' to the sugar industry... had a
triple justification. It was quick, cheap, and reversible .... As sugar
industry spokesmen frequently pointed out, Brazil could not have
reached such high production levels so quickly and at so reasonable a cost
without the resources of the sugar sector."'4
One of the most innovative governmental programs to emerge from
the late 1970s in Brazil was the agreement brokered between the Brazilian
government and large automobile manufacturers to produce cars that ran
on ethanol alone, rather than simply a blend of ethanol and gasoline.85 On
September 19, 1979, major automobile manufacturers signed an agree-
ment with the federal Brazilian government that created a protocol that
defined aims of mass production ethanol-only vehicles.86
Those were years of fighting without respite against the
reluctance of the consumer market, accustomed to using
a fuel acclaimed for over 80 years.
A great part of the Brazilian public expressed their disbe-
lief regarding the new product, mainly during the initial
stages of introduction.
This attitude was perfectly understandable when we con-
sider the following aspects:
81 Id.
82 id.
83 id.
8 Id. at 76-77.
' See Aldebert de Queiroz, The Role of the Brazilian Automotive Industry, in COPERSUCAR
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SUGAR AND ALCOHOL 497 (1985).
1 Id.
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1st-there was an enormous technological distance be-
tween the gasoline powered vehicles and those using the
new product.
2nd--enormous difficulties and a long delay were foreseen
for establishing a distribution network for the fuel.
3rd-above all, there was a great mistrust as to the future
availability of this fuel, considering the sugar-manufac-
turing tradition of Brazilian producers.87
The 1979 protocol was extremely ambitious in its scope. The aim
was to produce 250,000 ethanol-only vehicles by 1980; 300,000 by 1981 and
350,000 by 1982.88 The first ethanol-only vehicles appeared on the streets
in 1978.9 In order to help raise awareness of the new vehicle, priority for
these vehicles was given to governmental fleets.90 The government also
mounted a comprehensive information campaign about the vehicles.9'
C. Innovations in the 1980s
Following the initial years after the creation of Proalcool, several
factors contributed to the continued growth of the ethanol industry in
Brazil. First, international raw sugar prices continued to falter, and sec-
ond, the oil crisis in 1979 gave further support to the promotion of alter-
native fuels.92
Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1979 and the
second OPEC oil shock, the Brazilian government, under
the leadership of President Joao Figueiredo, opted to trans-
form the sugar stabilization plan into a full-fledged commit-
ment to alcohol as a substitute for gasoline. Alcohol would
now be used not only as an additive to gasoline (anhydrous
ethanol), but gradually would replace all gasoline in the
nation's auto fleet (hydrous ethanol).93
87/d.
' Silva, supra note 57, at 522.8 9 Id.
90 Id.91 Queiroz, supra note 85, at 497.
92 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 11.
9
' Id. at 77.
2008]
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Thus, the goal of Proalcool became more far-reaching. Rather than
acting as simply a short-term bolster of the sugar industry, it became, "a
full-fledged energy program."94 The ethanol production mandate was
raised to 10.7 billion liters by 1985 and following a government-sponsored
protocol issued in 1979, all major auto makers in Brazil were required to
phase in ethanol-consuming cars and phase out gasoline cars.95 This in-
crease in production was achieved by constructing new distilleries rather
than simply modifying existing plants.96 By 1985, 85-90% of Brazil's new
cars were alcohol powered.97 Two million of the total of ten million cars
were fueled completely by ethanol, the rest were fueled by gasohol.9"
Liberal governmental incentives and generous subsidies
drew major new private investment into the production of
ethanol in autonomous distilleries (autonomas), that is,
ethanol plants unattached to sugar production facilities.
By the end of Proalcool's first decade, autonomous plants
accounted for over half of all ethanol output... Proalcool
created an alcohol industry distinct from the sugar sector.
In a sense, ethanol had 'outgrown' even Brazil's massive
sugar industry.99
In explaining the "Brazilian Model" of government intervention
in the sugar industry during the Copersucar International Symposium
on Sugar and Alcohol, the president of the IAA at the time explained the
basic structure of the domestic market for sugar. °°
[RIegarding sugar for the internal market, the State inter-
venes in its marketing by fixing the total quantities to be
sold therein and the division of that total into monthly
quotas. Not only this, but our internal market is legally sub-
divided into two separate regions, and the producers of one
region are prohibited from selling to outlets in the other
region. This is not a restriction of free trade, it is out-and-
out prohibition.'0 '
9 4Id. at 11.95 Id. at 11, 77.
9' Id. at 77.
9 7Id. at 12.
98 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 12.
9 Id.
" See Vilela, supra note 12, at 39, 41.
1o0 Id. at 41.
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The President elaborated on the role of the government in the realm
of alcohol. Under the guidance of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the
National Petroleum Council was the governmental organ most closely
linked to supervising alcohol production." 2 It fell to the National Petroleum
Council to determine the quantity of alcohol to be purchased domestically
by fuel companies from alcohol manufacturers. 3 The National Petroleum
Council also established the amount of alcohol to be allocated to the chemi-
cal industry, creating a quota system for allocation.' ° It was the duty of
the Ministry of Finance, through the Central Bank and the Bank of Brazil
to intervene in the financing of the sugar cane economy, either acting inde-
pendently or conjointly with the IAA, creating export subsidies and pro-
viding capital to the sector.' 5 The relationship between the Bank of Brazil
and the IAA was extremely close, and "for many years the Bank had a near
monopoly of the supply of credit to the national sugar cane system."0 6
Additionally, the government attempted to control labor relationships in
the sugar cane sector.
Besides enjoying all the rights guaranteed to every worker,
sugar and alcohol industry workers receive an additional
benefit in the form of contributions of 1% of the value of
sugar, 1% of the value of sugar cane and 2% of the value
of alcohol produced each year in Brazil. These resources
are transferred to the sugar cane workers through their
associations and companies, all subject to inspection by the
IAA, which analyzes and approves the application of these
funds.0 7
In addition to incentives and subsidies, governmental involvement
in setting prices for alcohol continued in the 1980s. In 1980, the govern-
ment decreed that the price of hydrated alcohol, as sold to the consumer,
would be at most 65% higher than that of simply gasoline." s This price cap
was set in the hopes of reigning in the price of ethanol so that it would be
a viable choice for drivers in the country. 0 9
102Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
0 Vilela, supra note 12, at 41.107 Id. at 42.
108 Silva, supra note 57, at 523.
109 Id.
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1981 saw some hiccups in the rapid expansion of the Proalcool
program. To begin, consumers were not yet fully convinced that ethanol
blends and ethanol-powered vehicles were sound options." ° The higher
price of ethanol as well as irregular use by consumers furthered suspicion
of the fuel."' Even those consumers that were using ethanol had severe
misgivings. At the time, gasoline engines were being converted to burn
purely ethanol by auto repairers who would not observe the technical stan-
dards for the conversion and were not authorized by the government to
make these conversions."' The government decided to reduce the ethanol-
gasoline blend to 12% country-wide in order to prepare for what they ex-
pected would be an enormous increase in ethanol-powered vehicles." 3 But,
due to suspicion and mistrust of the fuel, this vast increase never mani-
fested itself, and producers were left with a surplus of ethanol."' In 1981,
the federal government made it "mandatory to equip ethanol pumps at
filling stations with direct-reading, temperature-corrected hydrometers
to allow the consumer himself to verify the quality of the product."" 5
Reacting to the setbacks, the Proalcool program suffered in 1981.
Thus, in 1982, the government took steps to fortify the program. The gov-
ernment worked with auto manufacturers to improve the performance of
ethanol-powered engines." 6 Additionally, the government set a price cap
on ethanol for a two-year period, requiring that it could be sold only at a
59% maximum of the price of gasoline." 7 In spurring the automobile in-
dustry, the government set an objective to manufacture 500,000 ethanol-
powered vehicles within the year."' This increase in ethanol-powered
vehicles was paralleled with an aim to expand alcohol production to meet
the expected demand."9 The government also created programs to spur
sales of ethanol-powered vehicles by reducing the taxes to be paid when
consumers purchased the cars. 20 Further, the ethanol-gasoline blend was
set once more at 20% for the entire country.' 2 '
110 Id.
111 Id.
112Id.
113 Id.
114 Silva, supra note 57, at 523.
115Id.
116Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Silva, supra note 57, at 523-24.
'20 Id. at 523.
121 Id.
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These governmental incentives, programs, and goals were successful
in catapulting the use of ethanol and the purchasing of ethanol-powered
vehicles. By 1983, the sale of ethanol-powered vehicles outnumbered that
of gasoline-only vehicles.'22 By 1984, the sale of ethanol-powered cars had
reached 84% of total vehicle sales in Brazil.123 Though the Proalcool pro-
gram suffered some setbacks initially, the government propelled ethanol
use in the country by using a wide variety of methods. Some of these meth-
ods could work best, or perhaps exclusively, in an authoritarian state, but
many may be copied or modified for more market-based economies.
D. Why Sugar Cane?
The use of sugar cane as the crop of choice for ethanol production
in Brazil is the result of several historical factors. The Proalcool decree
allowed for the use of either sugar cane or manioc root for the production
of ethanol."M Manioc (mandioca, in Portuguese), native to South America,
is easily cultivated in the region and has traditionally been grown as a sub-
sistence crop. 25 While Proalcool offered subsidies to both manioc-based
plants and sugar cane-based plants, the de facto standard in the alcohol
industry was the 120,000 to 240,000 liter per day facility, a scale that far
exceeded the typically smaller manioc plants. 26
While ethanol-producing sugar cane plants have increased their
efficiency over the years and have been able to minimize the net energy
used to create ethanol, there is evidence to suggest that manioc could be
a more energy efficient alternative to sugar cane as a ton of manioc yields
much more alcohol than a ton of cane. 27 Additionally, manioc is grown very
easily in all areas of the country, not just the major sugar cane strongholds
that exist in three Brazilian states.' In Brazil's NationalAlcohol Program:
Technology and Development in an Authoritarian Regime, Demetrius
argues that low agricultural productivity and production led most inves-
tors to choose sugar cane as the preferred raw material for alcohol pro-
duction.'29 He maintains that "[a] manioc-to-alcohol Proalcool [program]
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 48.
125 Id. at 48.
126 Id. at 51.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 48.
121 Id. at 51.
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would have benefitted some of Brazil's most impoverished peoples and
areas and avoided" placing sugar cane crops in already highly developed
regions. 1
30
Brazil's sugar cane-based alcohol production system, like
the sugar production technology Proalcool inherited, re-
sembles a solar system as a handful of lesser bodies gravi-
tate around a powerful celestial center. A manioc or even a
manioc-and-cane system, however, would have distributed
production much more evenly throughout the federation.
For example, were alcohol production based on the share
of manioc production of each state in 1975, Sao Paulo's
enormous share would have been diminished greatly and
the northeastern states, where millions rely on manioc as
a staple, would have accounted for almost 50 percent of
national output. 1 '
The choice of sugar cane over manioc as the preferred ethanol
crop was not directly mandated by the government, but by the existing
sugar cane farmers and producers who made sugar cane appear a more
viable alternative. While the Proalcool program mandated a vast increase
in ethanol production and while it also offered government-backed subsi-
dies and incentives to reach that goal, it was ultimately the responsibility
of private investors and companies to achieve the end result. As such,
sugar cane naturally appeared a more amenable crop as a means to reach
that end.
The infrastructure of a massive sugar cane industry had already
been established in the country and well-financed farmers and plant
owners were able to convince additional investors that sugar cane ethanol
production made more economic sense than alternatives such as manioc. 13
Because Proalcool ultimately depends on private initiative,
it can generate wealth-creating investment only where and
when private capital is able and willing to participate.
Proalcool cannot, within its limited jurisdiction, help to re-
solve the regional balance of income until the major tech-
nical problems thwarting the use of manioc or other crops
130 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 50.
131 id.
1321Id.
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are eliminated or until the northeast's sugar industry can
overcome the resistance of the very elites that dominate
it.1
33
Though a manioc-to-alcohol industry would have many benefits to
farmers outside of the realm of the sugar cane industry, it certainly was
not a complete solution to the dominance of sugar cane in Brazil. The coun-
try would perhaps be best served by following the language of the initial
Proalcool decree-to use sugar cane, manioc or any other suitable crops
to achieve ethanol production goals. Manioc happened to be a likely alterna-
tive simply because it was already widely grown throughout the country
and is suitable to alcohol production. However, a diverse selection of alter-
native crops would have best served environmental and economic goals.
E. Land Use Concerns
Though sugar cane production is concentrated mainly in two geo-
graphic regions of Brazil, the Northeast and the Center South, dramatic
land use changes are evident in both those regions since the inception of
Proalcool. Less than 1% of Brazil's total territory would be needed to reach
production of 30 billion liters of alcohol per year.14 However, the area in
which sugar cane production is most concentrated has experienced the
negative effects of a large monoculture crop. As explained above, most
sugar cane is currently grown in massive, interconnected areas. 35 A mono-
culture is the growing of only one species of crop, grown densely over a
large land area. As such, monocultures require increased use of pesticides,
since the area would be an ideal location for crop pests and diseases to
grow. Monocultures require vast areas of land, and therefore can lead to
the destruction of natural habitats. "In terms of the nation's total land
mass, the area required for the production of 10.7 billion liters of alcohol
seems absurdly small. A single square with sides measuring between 130
and 150 miles long can sustain this production."'36
By allowing very fertile agriculture production areas, such as Sao
Paulo, to be devoted to sugar cane necessarily drove other crops out of the
area, driving up the price of traditional food crops."3' Demetrius argues
1 Id. at 52.
1 Id. at 55.135 Id. at 80.
1 36 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 55.
1 3 Id. at 62-63.
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that the Proalcool program did not encourage sugar cane producers to
incorporate new land into the agricultural system, but extended the tradi-
tional sugar cane zones by expanding sugar cane monoculture into adjacent
lands that had traditionally been used by small policulture producers. 3 '
Under the aegis ofProalcool, sugar cane cultivation spread
by devouring lands adjacent to existing sugar cane zones.
This process of'phagocytosis' clearly indicates that, on the
whole, Proalcool has yet to live up to its promise to bring
new lands into production. Indeed, while fallow cane lands
stand idle, cane continues its advance into food crop lands. 139
Not only are traditional food crops forced to move to other areas,
the price of land surrounding sugar cane plantations has seen a dramatic
increase since the creation of Proalcool. 4 ° Additionally, the practice of
subsidizing one primary crop for ethanol production, especially a crop
that is dominated by a relatively few large-scale farmers, implies the
denial of similar subsidies to other crops or producers.
II. WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM BRAZIL
A dramatic recent development in U.S. energy legislation indicates
that the U.S. is poised to accept corn as the dominant ethanol crop in the
country. The "Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007" (2007 Act),
passed in December of 2007,"" and has as its cornerstone a mandate for
the increased production of renewable fuels. 42 The 2007 Act creates a
new subset of renewable fuels, labeled advanced biofuels and is further
divided into three parts: cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel and
other." The mandates for the increased Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
described in the 2007 Act requires the amount of renewable fuel and
advanced biofuel blended into gasoline to be increased over the next 4 to
14 years in each category of renewable fuel.'" The mandate's passage
"I Id. at 59.
'39 Id.
'40Id. at 81.
.. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(2007).
14 2 Id. at 1521-22.
4 Id. at 1519-20.
'" Id. at 1522-23.
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generated criticism from many political and environmental corners, the
most vocal being the Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, who requested a waiver
from the mandate for the state of Texas.145 Arguing that the mandate would
only further increase the price of corn, Governor Perry voiced concern for
increased costs that would be passed to both livestock owners and con-
sumers. 14 The U.S. EPA received over 15,000 public comments on the
mandate during the rulemaking period. 147 On August 7, 2008, the U.S.
EPA denied Texas's request for a waiver, setting the stage for the rapid in-
crease in renewable fuel production, as laid out in the following tables. 4 '
Applicable Volume of Renewable Fuel
Calendar Year: (in billions of gallons):149
2006 ............................... 4.0
2007 ............................... 4.7
2008 ............................... 9.0
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
... 11.1
12.95
13.95
... 15.2
16.55
18.15
... 20.5
.. 22.25
... 24.0
... 26.0
... 28.0
... 30.0
... 33.0
... 36.0
1 Ayesha Rascoe, Texas Governor Urges EPA to Grant Ethanol Waiver, REUTERS, June
24, 2008.
146 Id.
1' Environmental News Service, EPA Puts OffRenewable Fuels Wavier Decision to August,
July 23, 2008, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/ju12008/2008-07-23-093.asp.
14' DieselNet, US EPA denies Texas biofuel waiver request, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www
.dieselnet.com/news/2008/08epa.php.
149 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492,
1522 (2007).
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Applicable Volume of Advanced Biofuel
Calendar Year: (in billions of gallons):5 °
2009 ............................... 0.6
2010 .............................. 0.95
2011 .............................. 1.35
2012 ............................... 2.0
2013 .............................. 2.75
2014 .............................. 3.75
2015 ............................... 5.5
2016 .............................. 7.25
2017 ............................... 9.0
2018 .............................. 11.0
2019 ............................. 13.0
2020 .............................. 15.0
2021 .............................. 18.0
2022 .............................. 21.0
Applicable Volume of Cellulosic Biofuel
Calendar Year: (in billions of gallons):151
2010 ............................... 0.1
2011 .............................. 0.25
2012 ............................... 0.5
2013 ............................... 1.0
2014 .............................. 1.75
2015 ............................... 3.0
2016 .............................. 4.25
2017 ............................... 5.5
2018 ............................... 7.0
2019 ............................... 8.5
2020 .............................. 10.5
2021 .............................. 13.5
2022 .............................. 16.0
150Id.
'1 Id. at 1523.
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Applicable Volume of Biomass-based Diesel
Calendar Year: (in billions of gallons):152
2009 ............................... 0.5
2010 .............................. 0.65
2011 .............................. 0.80
2012 ............................... 1.0
Though the 2007 Act will primarily motivate a large-scale increase
in the amount of corn-based ethanol that is produced and used in the U.S.,
the Act also carves out provisions for alternatives to corn. 5 3 The U.S. could
learn much from the historical development of sugar cane use in Brazil
and perhaps look to incorporate many other alternative crops in ethanol
production. While sugar cane and corn remain the world's two most-used
crops for the ethanol industry, a great number of creative alternatives
could potentially be used, including: fast-growing trees and grasses, wood
chips, wheat straw, paper pulp, seaweed, municipal garbage and agricul-
tural waste products, to name a few.'54
A. Current Ethanol Production in the U.S.
In the United States, there are currently 134 corn-based ethanol
plants in operation compared with 95 in January 2006.' There are cur-
rently 77 more plants under construction and many more in various stages
of planning.5 6 Ethanol production has vastly increased in the U.S. in the
past three decades. According to the Renewable Fuels Association, in 1980,
the U.S. produced 175 million gallons of ethanol.157 In 2006, it produced
4,855 million gallons. 58 Currently, 26 states have ethanol plants, the vast
majority of which use corn as their sole feedstock.'59 The boom in ethanol
and ethanol plants has driven up the price of corn, which in turn, has
152 Id.
'53 Id. at 1519-20.
"5 U.S. International Trade Commission, Investigation No. 332-481, Industrial
Biotechnology: Development and Adoption by the U.S. Chemical and Biofuel Industries,
(2008).
... Renewable Fuels Association, Industry Statistics, http.//www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/
statistics/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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driven up the supply. In 2007, U.S. farmers planted more acres of corn
than at any time since 1944-90.5 million acres, 15% more acres than in
2006.160 Additionally, the acreage planted for soybeans, cotton and rice
in the U.S. have all decreased this year. 6'
The parallels between the development of the sugar cane-based
ethanol industry in Brazil and the current state of the corn-based ethanol
industry in the U.S. should be informative to anyone who can envision
room for improvement in the U.S. system. In the years before Proalcool
was initiated, the sugar cane industry in Brazil had steadily amassed polit-
ical support for a sugar cane-focused industry. By the time Proalcool was
initiated in 1975, through a combination of market forces, government
incentives and political will, the industry was controlled largely by a few
elite producers. In 2006, in the U.S., there were 46 farmer-owned ethanol
plants, nearly half of the total number of ethanol plants in the country.'62
However, of the 134 plants currently operating, only 49 of those are farmer-
owned.'63 Certainly, the U.S. ethanol industry seems to be heading in the
direction of the Brazilian industry of the early 1970's-a decrease in
smaller, independent ethanol plants and a corresponding increase in large
industry operated plants.
In order to weigh the viability of corn as a feedstock for ethanol,
it is necessary to examine it in comparison to other potential feedstocks.
In the U.S., there are two main methods of producing ethanol from corn;
wet and dry milling.6 4 Wet milling facilities can make a variety of corn-
based products such as sweeteners and gluten feed, while dry milling facil-
ities are dedicated solely to ethanol production.'65 The USDA states that,
approximately 2.65 gallons of ethanol can be produced from
a bushel of corn in existing wet mill facilities [and] plants
using the dry mill process can produce 2.75 gallons of etha-
nol per bushel of corn. Ethanol yield per bushel of corn in
the United States has increased significantly since 1980.166
160 Philip Brasher, What This Year's Corn Push Means to You, DES MOINES REGISTER,
Mar. 31, 2007, at 1A, available at http://desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article
?AID=/20070330/NEWS/70330007/1056/NEWS09.
161 Id.
162 Renewable Fuels Association, supra note 155.
163 Id.
16 USDA, supra note 3, at 11.
165 Id.
'6 Id. at 17.
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New ethanol plants utilize the latest technology to increase pro-
duction.'67 When comparing the ethanol yield per ton of feedstock to viable
alternative crops that are currently being used to produce ethanol, corn
is by far the leader. According to the USDA, "a ton of U.S. corn can yield
approximately 100 gallons of ethanol, compared with 25 gallons from a ton
of French sugar beets and 20 gallons from a ton of Brazilian sugarcane.""8
This measure alone does not tell the whole story, however.
It is the cost of producing that feedstock which ultimately
determines the relative economic feasibility of various feed-
stocks. In this regard, Brazil has a significant comparative
advantage, with estimated gross feedstock costs of about
30 cents per gallon of ethanol produced, compared to 97
cent per gallon for sugar beets in France and 80-85 cents
per gallon for corn in the U.S." 9
Additionally,
[tihe sugar and ethanol industry in Brazil has invested
approximately $40 million per year in research and develop-
ment since 1979. This research has contributed to the dra-
matic increase in sugar and ethanol productivity in Brazil
over the past thirty or so years. In 1975, sugarcane produc-
tion in Brazil averaged 16 tons per acre. By 2004, sugar-
cane yields were averaging over 32 tons per acre. Ethanol
production from sugarcane increased from 305 gallons per
acre to about 590 gallons per acre over this same period. 7 '
B. Diversification of U.S. Feedstock
A major lesson the United States could learn from Brazil is the
need to diversify feedstock used for ethanol production. As analyzed above,
Brazil, through a mixture of government incentives, market forces and
political maneuvering found itself with sugar cane as its main crop. This
occurred in Brazil even though the initial statute mandating the creation
167Id.
'8id. at 29.
169 d.171 USDA, supra note 3, at 28-29.
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of the national alcohol program, Proalcool, specifically mentioned not only
sugar cane as a potential feedstock, but also manioc root.'' Manioc root is
a perennial plant native to South America, easily grown on marginal land
and also highly suitable for ethanol production.
A potential parallel to manioc root in the United States is switch-
grass. Switchgrass is a rapid-growth perennial plant that can grow to
around six feet in height and is native to North America. 17 2 One of the
great benefits of large-scale use of switchgrass for ethanol production
would be that marginal land could be used rather than land currently
used for food production. Switchgrass would fall in the category of cellu-
losic feedstocks used for ethanol production, which is quickly emerging
as a very viable alternative to traditional ethanol feedstocks.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has designated switchgrass,
a warm-season tall-grass prairie native, as a potential biomass energy
crop, chosen because it produces more biomass than most other native
grasses. In other parts of the country, the DOE has experimented with
hybrids of poplar and willow trees, as they were better suited to differing
climates.'73 Cellulosic crops such as switchgrass are preferred for several
environmental reasons: they are able to hold the topsoil, capture carbon,
aid in cleaning and purifying runoff and can provide habitats for indige-
nous wildlife. 74
Additionally, switchgrass can be harvested and baled with con-
ventional farm equipment and a ton of switchgrass can produce approxi-
mately 80 gallons of ethanol. 75 Ethanol derived from switchgrass can
produce about five times more energy than it takes to grow, harvest, and
deliver it, according to studies by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 176 If
grown for biomass, switchgrass is cut once a year, in the fall after frost,
leaving about a 6-inch stubble on the ground. During growth and after har-
vest, switchgrass can be home to pheasants, grouse, and grassland birds. 177
"Switchgrass grown on marginal lands would stabilize the soil, reduce soil
erosion and siltation, and reduce nutrient runoff[, with] very little soil
171 Decreto No. 76.593, supra note 47, 53.
172 See, e.g., Don Comis, Scientists Study Feasibility of Switchgrass for Energy Production,
USDA, Mar. 10, 2006, http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/pr/2006/060310.htm.
173 See, e.g., Bales of Opportunity, 54 FARM AND HoME REs. 16, 18 (2003), available at
http://agbiopubs.sdstate.edu/articles/FHR54-2.pdf.
'
74 Id. at 16.
175 Id. at 18.
176 id.
177 id.
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compaction and soil disruption from machinery."7 ' "The people conduct-
ing this three-state research expect long-run total production costs of $30
a ton. And about $10 per ton to get the bales to the nearest plant." 179
The DOE is currently operating several experimental cellulosic
ethanol plants, designed to test whether switchgrass could be a viable
ethanol feedstock in the U.S.'" They have so far found that one of the first
areas where switchgrass can be economically grown as an ethanol crop
is the Northern Plains."' Additionally, the DOE has estimated that switch-
grass could yield 500 gallons of ethanol per acre.'82 "Bio-oil yields greater
than 60% by mass have been demonstrated for switchgrass, with energy
conversion efficiencies ranging from 52 to 81%."183
The case of switchgrass is simply one of many possible feedstock
alternatives to corn in the ethanol production industry. Ethanol can, has,
and could be made from a variety of feedstocks. The use of cellulosic crops
for ethanol production offers many environmental improvements over feed-
stocks such as corn or sugar cane. Though an improvement, certainly more
research on a greater number of alternative crops will provide other pos-
sible feedstock solutions. The U.S. should, however, learn from Brazil's
insistence on maintaining a monoculture of sugar cane for its ethanol
industry, in that diversification of feedstocks could lead to both environ-
mental and economic benefits.
Additionally, another very relevant lesson the U.S. could learn from
Brazil is in the area of industrial initiatives. By working closely with major
automobile manufacturers, the Brazilian government was able to set ex-
traordinary goals for the production of flex fuel cars." Perhaps even more
extraordinary was the fact that these goals were met by the manufactur-
ers.'18 Simply by looking at the Brazilian model, it is clear that such
78 Id. at 19.
179 Bales of Opportunity, supra note 137, at 18.
" U.S. Dep't of Energy, Bioenergy Research Centers an Overview of the Science, Feb. 2008
httpJ/genomicsgtl.energy.gov/centers/brcbrochure.pdf.
181 USDA, Improved Plants and Production Practices for Grasslands and Biomass Crops
in the Mid-Continental USA, AGRIcuLTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Sept. 15, 2008, http'/
www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq-no115=178898.
182 Ecotality Life, Tennessee Bets $70 Million on Switchgrass gas, Oct. 22, 2007, http:/!
ecotality.com/life/2007/1O/22/tennessee-bets-70-million-on-switchgrass-gas/.
183 USDA, Economic Competitiveness of Renewable Fuels Derived from Grains and Related
Biomass, AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Aug. 28, 2008, httpJ/www.ars.usda.gov/
researchlpublications/publications.htm?seq-no_1 15=202978.
'
83 See Queiroz, supra note 85, at 497.
185 Id.
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initiatives are well within the grasp of the U.S. government should it de-
cide to proceed down that path. Indeed, measures and agreements on not
only ethanol additives, but fuel economy as well as a host of environmental
initiatives are possible to foresee. The example of Brazil leaves little doubt
as to the possible success of such programs. With governmental backing,
industry support and informed consumers, such industrial initiatives
could readily be adopted in the United States.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Many of the criticisms that can be leveled against the Proalcool
program can find parallels in programs implemented in the United States
to boost corn-based ethanol production. A state-supported national push
to produce ethanol implicitly excludes many other environmentally bene-
ficial energy-reducing alternatives. "In choosing to address its petroleum
crisis by producing alcohol, Brazil underwrites the most energy-inefficient
form of transport-the private automobile."'86 "The decision to produce
ethanol for automobile carburetion places the interests of Brazil's usually
affluent car owners over those of the majority of the populace, which must
rely on buses for almost all of their transportation needs."" 7
Certainly, that is a criticism that could be raised any time a govern-
ment favors one system of alternative energy over another, but it is espe-
cially relevant in the U.S. where, for example, a great deal of improvement
could be made in fuel economy of cars. The promotion of ethanol need not
be at the exclusion of increased fuel economy, but by heavily promoting re-
newable fuels, the U.S. Administration seems to be able to deflect atten-
tion from other possible improvements in energy efficiency. Brazil chose
to invest in ethanol. Whether that investment was a conscious decision to
exclude other alternatives is left to debate."s However, Brazil lacks other
environmentally-minded transportation systems, such as a national rail
system.'89 "The allocation of resources to Proalcool limited or denied the
possibilities of other methods of reducing petroleum imports. These rather
substantial opportunity costs must be recognized, for Proalcool represents
a heavy drain on the national treasury and non-investment in other critical
sectors.""9 Ethanol use need not be a Faustian bargain between renewable
186 DEMETRIUS, supra note 6, at 62.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 66.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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energy and any other alternative plan or program, the United States can
learn from Brazil that there is room for many complimentary programs.
As American farmers proceed to plant the largest corn crop since
1944, a bumper crop heavily influenced by a record number of corn-based
ethanol plants under construction, the U.S. must seriously consider the
long-range effects such a pattern will have on other staple crops in the
country. "The rush to plant corn would come at the cost of other crops, par-
ticularly soybeans and cotton. The Agriculture Department said that if
farmers followed through with their stated intentions, soybean acreage
would be down 11 percent and cotton, 20 percent."'91 A necessary ripple
effect will occur if corn planting continues at this breakneck pace. Not only
will other staple food crops be affected, but industries that depend on such
crops will be competing directly with ethanol plants for the same raw
materials. Chicken feed, for example, normally contains 70 percent corn,
20 percent soybean meal and 10 percent minerals and other ingredients. 92
As the ethanol industry consumes a greater and greater share of the corn
market, feed costs have increased 40 percent since last summer." 3 "When
all of the current plants under construction are completed, probably in
early 2009, ethanol plants will need about 4.3 billion bushels of corn a
year to produce more than 12 billion gallons a year."9 4 The effect of this
profound boom in corn acreage will have on not only other staple food crops
in the nation, but also on those industries that depend on corn is difficult
to determine. Looking to Brazil as an example, the U.S. can learn much
from the Brazilian model. Sugar cane monocultures in the states of Sao
Paulo and in the Northeast region of the country drove out smaller, inde-
pendent farmers as well as drastically increased the price of surrounding
land. While the vast size of the country has allowed for the planting of ever
more sugar cane acreage without significantly affecting the production
of staple food crops, such a situation is not feasible in the U.S. The demand
for corn for ethanol production has already taken a toll on corn prices as
well as the acreage of other staple food crops. In order to combat this
trend, the U.S. should think seriously about increasing the diversity of
crops used for the production of ethanol.
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CONCLUSION
The United States currently sits at a crossroads in the ethanol
debate. The major players in the ethanol industry are heavily invested
in corn-based plants and production, virtually to the exclusion of all other
feedstocks. 9 ' Before the U.S. plunges ever further into an ethanol pro-
duction system that depends on a single crop, it would do well to look at
Brazil's ethanol history. Spanning over the past three decades, Brazil offers
a rich and detailed case history of a government-backed push to rapidly
and exponentially increase its ethanol production levels.'96 Set against the
backdrop of the oil crises in the mid 1970's, the Brazilian Proalcool pro-
gram offers many parallels to the current political and economic climate
in the United States. 9 7 Certainly, the uniqueness of the Brazilian authori-
tarian political system at the time of Proalcool's inception sets it apart, but
should the U.S. decide to follow Brazil's path, many of the governmental
incentives, subsidies and regulations could be emulated and modified for
the American political system.
One clear lesson that can be learned from Brazil's ethanol produc-
tion strategy is the need for greater diversity in crops used to produce the
fuel.'98 Though the Proalcool mandate listed sugar cane, manioc root and
any other feasible crop as the types of feedstocks that should be used in
producing ethanol, for the various reasons listed above, sugar cane became
the dominant crop. By ignoring other potentially more energy efficient,
environmentally sound crops, Brazil succumbed to an agro-industry that
had gained deep economic and political footholds in the country by the mid
1970's.'" A similar situation seems to be brewing in the United States. The
political strength of groups such as the National Corn Growers Association
as well as many state corn farmers' groups have been major supporters of
a corn-based ethanol industry. 00 This is a risky path to travel down. The
U.S. would be best served by examining the Brazilian model and improv-
ing upon it in the realm of creating diversity in the feedstocks.
Through diversification of the ethanol feedstocks as well as forging
agreements with large auto manufacturers to produce ethanol-friendly
cars, the U.S. could both adopt the successes of the Brazilian model of
"5 See supra Part II.
196 See supra Part I.A.
197 See id.
18 See supra Part I.D.
199 See id.
o See supra Part II.
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ethanol production as well as avoid several environmental dangers.2 °' The
history of ethanol production in Brazil provides an interesting insight
into how an authoritarian regime, dedicated to promoting an alternative
renewable fuel, managed to achieve that goal. Brazil used a variety of gov-
ernmental incentives, subsidies and mandates and was clearly affected
by changes in the market since the inception of the Proalcool program.0 2
The government, however, was able to adapt quickly to such changes and
modified programs and mandates to match the economic reality. The
debate over whether ethanol is truly the best solution to U.S. fuel concerns
could easily be the subject of another paper of similar length. However,
if the U.S. continues to careen towards exponential growth in the ethanol
production sector, it would be wise to learn from the lessons Brazilian
history can teach us.
201 See id.
2o2 See supra Parts I.A-D.
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